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Shapeshifting Corporations
Frank Partnoyt
This Article examines whether recent shifts among private and public markets are
part of a more general phenomenon of "shapeshifting" among corporate entities A shape-
shift is a transformation of corporate form involving the creation or use of a new legal
entity and one or more changes in structure, including capital structure and the allocation
of control right& Shapeshifting includes not only going private and private equity IPO
transactions; but forms of public-company regulatory arbitrage and use of variable interest
entities, structured investment vehicle.% collateralized debt obligations and related form
I assess whether the insights of Ronald Coase and Tibor Scitovsky might be relevant
to the analysis of shapeshifting, particularly private-equity transactions I examine whether
parties might shapeshift over time among seemingly Kaldor-Hicks efficient (or perhaps
inefficient) regimes and draw some preliminary conclusions about different shapeshifting
transaction I argue that there are parallels between the rationales for shapeshifting and
Coase's arguments about why transactions take place in firms rather than in markets
Coasian boundary determinations essentially are a function of direct and indirect
costs Shapeshifting is no different, yet regulatory interference leads firms to shift shape in
undesirable ways Specifically, going-private transactions have a stronger normative justi-
fication than structured finance transactions, because they are subject to lower direct and
indirect costs I conclude that scholars considering one category of shapeshifting might
sharpen their normative analysis through comparisons to other shapeshifting transactions
INTRODUCTION
The cycle of private-equity transactions has drawn commentators
from numerous perspectives to a range of empirical inquiries. In this
Article, I want to step back from those inquiries and ask a broad theo-
retical question about the role of private-equity transactions in the
economy. It is a question similar to the one Ronald Coase addressed in
his 1937 essay, The Nature of the Firm: "why a firm emerges at all in a
specialised exchange economy."1 Instead of asking "firm versus market,"
I want to ask "firm versus firm?" In particular, I want to consider, in a
broad context, the following puzzle: why do corporations cycle from
public to private, then back to public, then back to private, and so
forth? Is there something about this cyclicality that creates value? Or
is the cycle a sign of dysfunctionality in the corporate enterprise? Do
such transactions reduce agency costs, or increase them? If there is a
t George E. Barrett Professor of Law and Finance, University of San Diego School of Law.
I am grateful to Laura Adams, Todd Henderson, and Shaun Martin for their comments.
1 Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 390 (1937) (questioning why
firms emerge and concluding that there must be costs to using the price mechanism alone to organ-
ize production of goods).
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strong case for private equity and going-private transactions, why don't
more firms remain private?
Simply put, the question is this: why do firms change shape? By
changing shape, I am referring to changes in the form of doing busi-
ness, not to changes in business lines or strategy. The classic example is
the going-private transaction, but there are many other examples. I
want to examine whether recent shifts between private and public mar-
kets are part of a more general phenomenon of "shapeshifting" among
corporate entities.
Although many commentators have focused on the (until) recent
increase in public to private shifts-specifically, going-private transac-
tions- several other kinds of shifts have received less scrutiny. This Ar-
ticle considers whether all of these shifts might fall within a broader
theory about corporate structures and financial markets, and whether
normative assessments of each category might benefit from compari-
sons to other categories.
I begin by describing several categories of shifts and providing ex-
amples. I define a shapeshift generally as a transformation of corporate
form involving the creation or use of a new legal entity and one or more
changes in structure, including capital structure and the allocation of
control rights. Shapeshifting is structural in nature and should be dis-
tinguished from changes in the allocation of assets through, say, mer-
ger. In addition to various types of going-private and private-equity
initial public offering (IPO) transactions, I consider certain forms of
public company regulatory arbitrage, as well as the alphabet soup of
variable interest entities (VIEs), structured investment vehicles (SIVs),
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
I then analyze whether these categories have common elements
or are responses to overlapping incentives. I begin this analysis with a
theoretical limiting construct for assessing the shifts, based in part on a
paradox first illustrated by Tibor de Scitovsky.2 The Scitovsky paradox
states that "it is possible for one social state (S1) to be Kaldor-Hicks
efficient relative to another (S2) while at the same time S2 is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient relative to S1. ' The paradox is that under certain condi-
tions it is possible to satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency rationale, and
make one party better off while leaving the other party no worse off, in
both directions. One cannot speak meaningfully about efficiency when
the rationale criterion suggests both that a move-and its opposite-
2 See T. de Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 Rev Econ Stud 77,
86-88 (1941). I am grateful to Anita Bernstein for her thoughts regarding potential applications
of the Scitovsky paradox.
3 Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation,
28 Fla St U L Rev 241,259 (2000).
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are efficient. The Scitovsky paradox is not a perfect analogy to shape-
shifting transactions, but it is a useful metaphor for examining whether
parties might shapeshift over time between seemingly Kaldor-Hicks
efficient, and perhaps inefficient, regimes.
I then assess potential explanations of shapeshifting. Just as Coase
found that there were several factors that described why transactions
might take place within firms (rather than in markets), I find several fac-
tors that describe why transactions might take place within newly shaped
firms. By analyzing these factors, one can get a sense of where shapeshift-
ing is headed in the future, and which types are normatively desirable.
For example, shapeshifting might reflect agency costs within cor-
porate entities, as a method for agents to extract value from principals
(or vice versa). Shapeshifting might reflect information asymmetry or
moral hazard. Shapeshifting might occur in response to exogenous law-
related shocks, such as changes in legal rules or regulatory approaches.
Finally, shapeshifting might generate gains through "creative destruc-
tion"' or "shock therapy.' 6 These factors can be separated into two
broad categories: direct and indirect costs.
Although I do not attempt an empirical study of these costs at this
stage, I include some arguments as to which categories of transactions
are more likely to generate net benefits from shapeshifting. I suggest
some reasons why, relative to other forms of shapeshifting, going-private
transactions are potentially higher benefit and lower cost, whereas struc-
tured finance transactions are potentially lower benefit and higher cost.
In each instance, when corporate entities shift shapes, the shifting
reflects fundamental underlying changes. However, the normative anal-
ysis varies case by case. The main point of the Article is not to put forth
a formula for determining when shapeshifting is normatively desira-
ble, but to recognize that broad categories of transactions can be ana-
lyzed under the same rubric.'
4 Scitovsky's paradox depended on assumptions about the utility functions of the parties, but
the findings of behavioral economics (such as differences between parties' "willingness to pay" and
"willingness to accept") also provide a framework for analyzing the conditions under which the
paradox might hold. See id at 259-62 (discussing criticisms of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
5 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 81-83 (Harper 1942) (de-
scribing capitalism as an "evolutionary process," driven by innovation and creativity, which inevitably
destroys old economic structures).
6 See Steven N. Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts, 6 J Applied Corp Fin
15, 24 (Spring 1993) (identifying two kinds of leveraged buyouts: those that function as a one-time
"shock therapy" to accomplish discrete changes, and those that function as a long-term transforma-
tion where private equity is "a more efficient form of organization").
7 Potential examples extend beyond those analyzed here. Scholarship analyzing the prolife-
ration of LLCs, LLPs, and partnerships might embrace the concept of shapeshifting, and assess the
differences among types of shifts The move by an operating company from corporation status to an
LLC differs markedly from the creation of new conduit LLCs or similar vehicles for securitization
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I. CATEGORIES OF SHAPESHIFTING
In this Part, I briefly describe several categories of shapeshifting.
This list is not intended to be comprehensive, and I do not attempt
to describe each category in detail. Instead, the point is to set forth
several markers of shapeshifting and some representative categories
of transactions.
A. Going Private
Numerous commentators have described the recent increase (and
subsequent decline) in going-private transactions. For example, as Mi-
chael Jensen has noted, in 2007, "2,700 private-equity funds represented
a quarter of global mergers and acquisition activity, half of leveraged
loan volume, a third of the high yield bond market, and a third of the
initial public offerings market."' Although this activity recently has
subsided, private equity remains an important force in modem finan-
cial markets, with roughly $1 trillion of capital available for deals.9
Jensen has also recently revisited the argument he made in 1989'
that private equity was a new and powerful model of management, in
large part because private firms could avoid the agency and governance
costs associated with public ownership and could benefit from debt
monitoring and concentrated equity holdings among managers." Like-
wise, Ronald Gilson and Charles Whitehead have argued that such pri-
vatization reflects dramatic changes in risk management, which have
led to a new equilibrium favoring private ownership." The articles in
this Issue are an excellent guide to going-private transactions.
transactions. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U Chi L
Rev 289 (2009) (examining private-equity firms as a model of corporate governance structure in the
resolution of agency problems between owners and operators). Although I do not address these
other entities in any detail here, my hope is that the analytical framework in this Article will apply
to shapeshifting among these other categories as well. Prediction markets for contingent corporate
forms might be another area of inquiry. See Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Predic-
tion Markets for Corporate Governance, 82 Notre Dame L Rev 1343,1346-47 (2007).
8 Michael C. Jensen, The Economic Case for Private Equity (and Some Concerns) slide 5
(2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963530E visited Jan 11, 2009) (listing Morgan Stanley's
estimates for the size of private-equity activity).
9 Private Equity Firepower Tops $1 Trillion: Study, (Reuters Jan 15, 2009), online at http://
www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSTRE5OE56920090115 (visited Feb 10, 2009).
10 See generally Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 Harv Bus Rev 61
(Sept/Oct 1989) (discussing the advantages of private equity relative to public corporations).
11 See Jensen, The Economic Case for Private Equity at slides 7-14 (cited in note 8).
12 See generally Ronald J. Gilson and Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public
Ownership, Agency Cost and Complete Capital Markets, 108 Colum L Rev 231 (2008). Gilson
and Whitehead recognize that "continued capital markets innovation may cause [their] predic-
tions to be wrong." Id at 263.
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I want to put aside until Part III the question of whether these
commentators and others are correct about the potentially permanent
benefits associated with going-private transactions, and observe mere-
ly that the movement from public to private-to the extent it occurs-
can be conceptualized as a shift in corporate shape. The structure of
private firms more closely resembles a partnership, and the capital
structures of private firms also have different components and weights.
The benefits that proponents of private equity claim flow from going-
private transactions arise primarily from these structural changes and
the resulting changes in agency and governance costs.
Thus, the corporate decision to move from public to private resem-
bles the Coasian"3 decision between firms and markets. Just as Coase
argued that transactions would take place alternatively in firms or
markets depending on relative costs and benefits, so too do transac-
tions take place in private or public firm structures, based on a similar
kind of cost-benefit calculus.
B. Private-equity IPOs
More recently, several private-equity firms have cycled back to
the public markets in yet a new form. They have raised funds by is-
suing public shares in IPOs, essentially creating publicly held private-
equity "conglomerates," which are among the largest global firms by
market capitalization.
For example, consider the following four prominent private-equity
firms, each of which completed IPOs relatively recently:
TABLE 1
Fund IPO Amount Fund Assets
Blackstone Group LP $4.1 billion $88.4 billion
GLG Partners Inc $3.4 billion $20.0 billion
Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC $1.0 billion $26.8 billion
Fortress Investment Group, LLC $0.6 billion $29.9 billion
Source: Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 Colum Bus L Rev 172, 221.
These private-equity IPOs can be viewed as a kind of shape rever-
sal, from public companies that were taken private to private-equity
firms that decide to shift back to a public structure. The new shapes do
13 The legal academy is closely split on the question of whether to use "Coasian" or "Coa-
sean." I decided on "Coasian" after a search for both terms in the Lexis-Nexis Law Reviews &
Journals database on August 3,2008, which revealed that although law review articles overall split
roughly 61 percent to 39 percent in favor of "Coasean," law review articles that cite my work
split roughly 63 percent to 37 percent in favor of "Coasian."
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not precisely match the old public company ones, but there are over-
lapping incentives and rationales. The public-private-public shift raises
questions about the kinds of factors that would drive shape reversals
and about what function such reversals might play in the market. I
address these issues in Part III.
The important but simple point for now is that private-equity IPOs
are a kind of cyclical shapeshifting transaction, away from a partner-
ship-style structure and allocation of rights towards the public form
that the underlying businesses had before they were taken private.
These cyclical shapeshifts revive many of the agency and governance
costs that previously arose when the businesses were structured as pub-
licly held firms.
C. Public Company Regulatory Arbitrage
It might seem surprising to see private-equity firms cycling back
to public markets through IPOs, but private firms, particularly hedge
funds, are using public company shapeshifts in other, even more unex-
pected, ways. In some instances, hedge funds have found it attractive to
shift away from their private, largely unregulated, status to the more
traditional shape of a public operating company.
This transformation is more complex and subtle than private-
equity IPOs. It also is relatively new, and little noticed, but might be-
come a significant phenomenon, particularly as the substantial funds
controlled by hedge fund activists are invested. Activist hedge funds
purchase (or sell short) concentrated ownership positions in public com-
panies. In the simplest case, one or more hedge funds acquire substan-
tial (typically a "sweet spot" of 5 to 10 percent) equity stakes and then
press for strategic change. Their involvement leads to immediate and
dramatic changes in the shareholder base of a company, and typically
also results in positive returns for shareholders.'
4
For example, when Edward Lampert, a prominent hedge fund man-
ager, decided to take control of Sears Holding Corporation-the pub-
licly traded parent corporation of Kmart and Sears, Roebuck and Com-
pany, and the fourth largest US retailer-he did not seek to privatize
Sears or make it a privately held subsidiary of his hedge fund, ESL In-
vestments. Instead, he maintained Sears as a public company, albeit a
company with a new shape and a new investor base.5
14 See Alon Bray, et al, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Perfor-
mance, 63 J Fin 1729, 1730-32 (2008) (identifying a two-thirds success rate for activist hedge
funds that propose "strategic, operational, and financial" changes and an approximate 7 percent
abnormal return).
15 See Gretchen Morgenson, Michael Barbaro, and Geraldine Fabrikant, Saving Sears
Doesn't Look Easy Anymore, NY Times BU1 (Jan 27,2008) (describing the current Sears corpo-
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Lampert securitized Sears's main business lines and segregated
those assets, including the intellectual property associated with individ-
ual businesses, into separate subsidiary vehicles." Then, most remarka-
bly, he used the Sears public holding company assets as collateral to
enter into total return swaps based on unspecified equities." Total re-
turn swaps are private bilateral contracts in which one party agrees to
pay the other a fixed return during a period of time in exchange for
payments based on the increase or decline in the value of a specified
security."8 At certain points, the bulk of Sears's net income appeared to
be from those swaps. For example, during the third quarter of fiscal
2006, Sears recognized $101 million of investment income from total-
return swaps, and just $196 million of net income. '9
Indeed, this move from hedge fund to public company is just one
example of a sweeping array of incremental shape changes that have
dramatically affected public companies. The simplest example is the
use of total return equity swaps and other equity derivatives by hedge
funds to create synthetic equity positions in which parties obtain ex-
posure to changes in the prices of securities without actually owning
any underlying securities.'° Not only can the shareholder base of a cor-
poration turn over almost instantaneously, but the economic residual
claimants to a corporation's cash flow can shift to reside in private con-
tracts instead of equity claims issued by the corporation.2'
Other related public company arbitrage shifts have occurred as
financial institutions have noted the substantial profits and fee income
associated with hedge funds generally. As a result, they have trans-
formed themselves-or at least some part of their structure-into
hedge funds or hedge fund-like entities to capture both expected high
returns for shareholders and high compensation for employees. These
strategies include involvement in the category of shapeshifting trans-
rate structure); Gregory Zuckerman, Amy Merrick, and Ray A. Smith, Attention Shoppers, Sears Is
Up, Wall St J Cl (Feb 24,2005) (describing the structure of the proposed Sears Holding company).
16 See Robert Bemer, The New Alchemy at Sears, Bus Wk 58 (Apr 16,2007) (describing the
securitization of several key brands).
17 See Evelyn M. Rusli, Sears; Where America Shops Less, Forbescom (May 4,2007), online at
http..www.forbeconi2007/05/04/sears-lampert-kmart-markets-equity-cx er- 04marketsl2.htm
(visited Jan 11, 2009).
18 For a more thorough introduction to these transactions, see Gunter Dufey and Florian Rehm,
An Introduction to Credit Derivatives *4 (Ross School of Business Working Paper Series No 00-013,
Aug 2000), online at http'//deepblue.lib.umich.eduhandle/2027.42/35581 (visited Jan 11, 2009).
19 See Sears Holdings Corporation, Form 1O-Q for the Quarter Ending October 28, 2006 11,13,
online at httpJfidea.sec.gov/Archivesledgar/datal1310067/000119312506247053/dlOq.htm (visited Jan
11,2009).
20 See Dufey and Rehm, An Introduction to Credit Derivatives at *4 (cited in note 18).
21 See Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U Ill L Rev 775,778--80
(describing potential separations of the income and equity interests in a share).
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actions discussed below (which have generated surprisingly large losses
recently for these financial institutions).
D. VIEs, SIVs, and CDOs
One might have imagined that the use of so-called Special Purpose
Entities (SPEs) would decline after the collapse of Enron, which was
widely-though, in my view, incorrectly-regarded as a story about
their fraudulent use.2 Yet SPEs have not only resurfaced, but have be-
come both more common and potentially more problematic. The major
substantive difference is terminology: now SPEs are called either Qua-
lifying SPEs (QSPEs) or Variable Interest Entities.
I discuss the QSPE and VIE framework in greater detail in Part III.
Both QSPEs and VIEs are off-balance sheet entities that result from
a corporate shapeshifting transaction. Specifically, the firm transfers
assets and liabilities to a separate entity that is not consolidated. The
arguments for nonconsolidation resemble the arguments that applied
pre-Enron but are focused much more on non-ownership-related con-
siderations, such as equity at risk and the right to make significant deci-
sions.' Instead of applying a mechanical test of ownership to determine
whether the corporation should consolidate the entity, the new rules
focus on more general questions about the corporation's level of in-
volvement in the entity.
A structured investment vehicle is a special purpose entity that
borrows money by issuing short- and medium-term debt and then uses
that money to buy longer-term securities, including mortgage bonds
and other asset-backed securities. An SIV is sometimes called a "con-
duit" because it raises short-term funds and channels those funds into
longer-term assets. An SIV's business model resembles that of a bank:
it seeks to earn a spread between the interest rate at which it borrows
and the interest rate at which it lends.4
An SIV involves a shapeshift of liabilities and structure, but not
assets. An SIV's assets typically include investment-grade-rated, as-
set-backed securities; residential mortgage-backed securities; and
CDOs, which resemble SIVs.
An SIV typically has three categories of liabilities: commercial pa-
per (CP), senior medium-term notes (MTNs), and other medium-term
debt ("Capital Notes"). The CP and MTNs are senior in priority to the
22 See generally Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed- How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Finan-
cial Markets ch 10 (Henry Holt 2003).
23 See Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Interpretation No. 46(R) 2 (2003),
online at http://www.fasb.org/fin46r.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009).
24 See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for
the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash U L Q 619,672-74 (1999).
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Capital Notes, which bear the first loss if an SIV's assets decline in
value. Moreover, the equity of an SIV typically is of nominal value.
Accordingly, the credit quality of an SIV's assets is particularly impor-
tant to the holder of Capital Notes. The authorized share capital of an
SIV typically is minimal, a small fraction of the company's overall cap-
ital. Indeed, from an economic perspective the holders of Capital
Notes are the true residual claimants of the SIV.
An SIV is subject to both solvency and liquidity risk. First, the
solvency of an SIV may be at risk if the value of its long-term assets
falls below the value of its short-term liabilities. Second, even if the
value of an SIV's assets is higher than the value of its liabilities, it is
subject to liquidity risk from the maturity mismatch of its assets and
liabilities, particularly if the SIV cannot refinance short-term liabilities
at favorable rates and is forced to sell in a depressed market.
Like an SIV, a CDO typically is a special purpose entity that pur-
chases fixed income assets and finances these purchases by issuing dif-
ferent tranches (or slices) of securities." Both SIVs and CDOs typically
are designed to invest in sufficiently high-grade and highly rated assets
with a sufficient degree of diversification to generate highly rated lia-
bilities. For example, a CDO might issue senior tranches (rated AAA),
mezzanine tranches (rated AA to BB), and equity tranches (unrated).
Losses are applied in reverse order of seniority. Each tranche has a claim
on the same pool of assets, but the risk-return profiles of the tranches
vary because they differ in seniority. More junior tranches are riskier and
offer higher coupon or interest payments to compensate for higher de-
fault risk. More senior tranches are less risky and offer lower payments.
All of these entities involve shapeshifting by firms. Specifically,
firms take financial assets of a particular form with a specified liability
structure and create a new structure with the same assets but with a
different form and a new liability structure. The underlying firm assets
do not change, but the use of a new structure and entities generates
apparent benefits that cover the transaction costs associated with a
shift in shape."
II. A THEORY OF SHAPESHIFFING
As Part I illustrated, the financial economy is filled with various
kinds of shape-changing transactions. In this Part, I consider a general
framework for assessing such shapeshifting. In particular, I am inter-
ested in examining cyclical shapeshifting, from one form to another,
2 See generally Partnoy, Infectious Greed at ch 11 (cited in note 22).
26 See Frank Partnoy and David A. Skeel, Jr, The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75
U Cin L Rev 1019,1027-31,1040-46 (2007).
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back again, and so forth. One example of such cyclical shapeshifting
would be an IPO followed by a going-private transaction followed by
another IPO. Another would be the issuance of debt instruments fol-
lowed by a securitization of those instruments in a CDO followed by a
securitization of CDO tranches in an SIV.
Scitovsky wrote against a backdrop of extensive financial innova-
tion and dramatic market changes. It is worth considering the context
in which he developed his controversial utilitarian paradox theory. His
article, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics," was published in
1941, but it reflected thinking from the period of dramatic financial
change before and after the 1929 crash.8
Ignoring this historical perspective can lead to incorrect conclu-
sions about modem markets. For example, Professors Gilson and White-
head assert, "The capital markets of the 1930s were relatively incom-
plete, with few financial instruments available to firms or investors
beyond stocks, bonds, and bank loans."29 However, the very documents
they cite in their recent article on private equity-particularly Adolf
Berle's 1928 corporate finance treatise"-describe expansive financial
innovation during this time, ranging from new financing techniques to
novel hybrid securities to many of the instruments we label deriva-
tives today.3' Options, conversion rights, and capital structure splicing
were commonplace.
During this time, many corporations were privately owned but had
publicly traded capital slices with limited control rights. Many compa-
nies represented Myron Scholes's more recent ideal of a firm with
concentrated, privately held equity ownership and hybrid/debt outside
capital.' There was a dramatic increase in the use of "B" and nonvot-
ing shares during this period, pioneered by Ivar Kreuger," the Swedish
27 T de Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics; 9 Rev Econ Stud 77 (1941).
28 Consider Scitovsky, 9 Rev Econ Stud at 88 (cited in note 2). For a description of Scitovsky's
background, see Lisa Trei, Prominent Economist Tibor Scitovsky Dead at 91, Stanford News Service
(June 5, 2002), online at http://news-service.stanford.edu/pr/02/scitovsky6l2.html (visited Jan 11,
2009) (describing Scitovsky's background and the impetus for his early economic ideas).
29 Gilson and Whitehead, 108 Colum L Rev at 240 (cited in note 12).
30 Adolf A. Berle, Jr, Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance vi-vii, 42-45,153-57 (Cal-
laghan 1928) (describing innovations in corporate structure such as nonvoting stock, option
rights, and subsidiary corporations).
31 See Gilson and Whitehead, 108 Colum L Rev at 240 n 46 (cited in note 12).
32 See Berle, Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance at 131-38 (cited in note 30).
33 See Myron S. Scholes, Derivatives in a Dynamic Environment, 88 Am Econ Rev 350,351,
366-67 (1998) (noting the long history of derivatives and arguing that while public ownership is
inefficient, private ownership could benefit from financial innovations that provide the risk sharing,
liquidity, and pricing signals of public trading).
34 Ivar Kreuger created so-called "B" shares by dividing common shares into two classes.
Each class would have the same claim to dividends and profits, but the "B" share would carry only
1/1,000 of a vote, compared to one vote for each "A" share. See William Z. Ripley, Main Street and
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financier whose American subsidiary, International Match, became the
model for companies looking to optimize the balance between private
and public ownership."
In response to the Great Depression, several economists began writ-
ing welfare economics papers prescribing certain policy changes. In
particular, Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks separately wrote papers in
the late 1930s presenting arguments that previous assumptions about
the impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons had been incor-
rect and that the welfare consequences of many previously unsolvable
problems could now be assessed.M They argued in favor of the notion,
now widely known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, that an outcome is more
"efficient" if, in theory, those made better off could compensate those
made worse off, even if such compensation does not take place.
This was the quagmire Scitovsky entered. As noted in the Intro-
duction, Scitovsky argued that "it is possible for one social state (S,) to
be Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to another (S2) while at the same
time S2 is Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to Si. Several legal academ-
ics have used the Scitovsky paradox to support arguments that discre-
dit cost-benefit analysis, while others have argued that Scitovsky re-
versals are possible only under circumstances that do not practically
matter.3 But Scitovsky was not merely setting forth a logical paradox.
His argument rebutted the assumption that dramatic economic change
and financial innovation automatically should be regarded as efficient
Wall Street 85-90 (Little, Brown 1927) (describing the growth of nonvoting shares); William H.
Stoneman, The Life and Death of Ivar Kreuger 72 (Bobbs-Merrill 1932) (describing the involve-
ment of Ivar Kreuger in developing "B" shares).
35 However, International Match did not remain a model for very long. By late 1931, interna-
tional investors had begun seriously questioning the company's accounting, which eventually led to
the company's collapse and Kreuger's suicide. See Frank Partnoy, The Match King: Ivar Kreuger,
The Financial Genius behind a Century of Wall Street Scandals ch 13 (PublicAffairs 2009); The
Match King: Fraud and Financial Innovation, Economist 115-17 (Dec 22, 2007).
36 See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons
of Utility, 49 Econ J 549, 550-52 (1939); John R. Hicks, Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49
Econ J 696,711-12 (1939).
37 Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 259 (cited in note 3),
citing generally Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in EconomicA 9 Rev Econ Stud 77
(cited in note 2).
38 See Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law 95-132 (Oxford 1998) (concluding
that the law cannot make judgments between welfare allocations on Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency grounds); Richard S. Markovits, A Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition
and Use of the Concept of "The Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency": Why the
Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtually All Law-and-economics Welfare Arguments
Are Wrong, 1993 U Ill L Rev 485,512-15 (arguing that the potential for negative wealth elastici-
ty creates distortions in traditional cost-benefit analysis).
39 See Andrew Schmitz and Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr, The Unimportance of the Scitovsky Para-
dox and Its Irrelevance for Cost-benefit Analysis *5 (Aug 13, 2007), online at http://web.uvic.ca/
econ/schmitz.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009).
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simply because private parties had revealed their preferences by agree-
ing to the transactions.
I will use a stylized example to illustrate the conditions under which
the Scitovsky paradox might hold for corporate shapeshifting. I am not
asserting that this example represents shapeshifting transactions gen-
erally, but it is a useful framework for thinking about the nature of
cyclical shapeshifting.
Assume that there are two potential and competing beneficiaries
to a corporation's profits. One might imagine them as private and pub-
lic investors, managers and shareholders, or equity and debt. For sim-
plicity, I label them Parties A and B. Assume that the parties can receive
goods X and Y, and that each Party prefers one unit of each of X and Y
to two units of either X or Y. This is a simplifying assumption used in
much of the cost-benefit literature and is made for illustrative purposes.
One example of the effect of shapeshifting is set forth in Table 2.
Suppose corporate Shape 1 will generate the following payoffs: (1) two
units of X and zero units of Y for Party A, and (2) zero units of X and
one unit of Y for Party B. Further suppose that corporate Shape 2 will
generate the following payoffs: (1) two units of X and one unit of Y for
Party A, and (2) zero units of X and two units of Y for Party B. A simi-
lar rationale would apply for a variety of payoffs to corporate Shape 2.
TABLE 2
Shape 1 Shape 2
Payoff X Payoff Y Payoff X Payoff Y
Party A 2 0 2 1
Party B 0 1 0 2
Obviously, a move from Shape 1 to Shape 2 is Pareto efficient.
Likewise, if changes in technology, economics, or regulation changed
the payoff to Shape 1, as set forth in the Table 3, a change from Shape 2
back to Shape 1 also would be Pareto efficient.
TABLE 3
Shape 1 Shape 2
Payoff X Payoff Y Payoff X Payoff Y
Party A 2 1 2 1
Party B 1 1 0 2
Again, one might think of the above examples as illustrating a
move from public to private ownership, and then a return to public
ownership, or any other of the classifications described in Part I. The
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important point is that these examples set forth rationales in which
shapeshifting would be normatively justified on basic utilitarian eco-
nomic principles.
However, such examples are not the only ones that describe cir-
cumstances under which Parties A and B would agree to shapeshift. In
particular, one might observe shapeshifting even in the absence of the
kinds of Pareto efficient changes set forth above.
A simple version of the Scitovsky paradox in this context is set
forth in Table 4.40 Suppose that corporate Shape 1 will generate the fol-
lowing payoffs: (1) two units of X and zero units of Y for Party A, and
(2) zero units of X and one unit of Y for Party B. Further suppose that
corporate Shape 2 will generate the following payoffs: (1) one unit of X
and zero units of Y for Party A, and (2) zero units of X and two units of
Y for Party B.
Again, one might think of the shape choices as being any of the
examples mentioned in Part I. For example, corporate Shape 1 might
be a privately held firm, whereas corporate Shape 2 might be a public-
ly held firm. Goods X and Y can be thought of as the means of compen-
sation for the two parties. For example, X might be stock options, which
Party A (managers) would receive, whereas Y might be dividends,
which Party B (shareholders) would receive. I assume, probably rea-
sonably, that units of X and Y are convertible into each other, or into
equal amounts of cash.
In this simplified example, Table 4 depicts the payoff to the two
parties.
TABLE 4
Shape 1 Shape 2
Payoff X Payoff Y Payoff X Payoff Y
Party A 2 0 1 0
Party B 0 1 0 2
Now, the shift cannot be normatively justified based on a Pareto
criterion. Instead, the analysis fits within the Kaldor-Hicks framework
that Scitovsky criticized. A move from Shape 1 to Shape 2 is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient, because once the firm has changed shape Party B can
give one unit of Y to make Party A better off without making Party B
worse off, as compared to Shape 1. (Recall that the parties can receive
goods X and Y and that each party prefers one unit of each X and Y to
40 This example is based on Coleman, Markets; Moras; and the Law at 104-405 (cited in note
38); Schmitz and Zerbe, The Unimportance of the Scitovsky Paradox at 4-7 (cited in note 39).
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two units of either X or Y) But once Shape 2 is achieved, a move from
Shape 2 to Shape 1 also is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because after the
shape change Party A can give one unit of X to make Party B better off
without making Party A worse off, as compared to Shape 2. This shifting
could continue indefinitely, from Shape 1 to Shape 2 and back again, in
an endless cycle of Kaldor-Hicks efficient shapeshifting transactions.
When would Parties A and B elect to change shape under such
conditions? In other words, how frequently might a Scitovsky reversal
appear in practice? One could argue that the reversals would be un-
usual, given the dominance of available Pareto superior alternatives.
Given Shape 1, Party A can make itself better off simply by switching
one unit of X to one unit of Y. Conversely, given Shape 2, Party B can
make itself better off simply by switching one unit of Y to one unit of
X. These are Pareto superior moves, so in order for Scitovsky reversals
to be significant, it must be the case that such Pareto moves are not
attractive, because such trade is not permitted or is too costly.
More generally, the extent of shapeshifting should depend on the
parties' differential valuations of traded assets. If Parties A and B differ
in their willingness to pay (WTP) versus willingness to accept (WTA),
a shift can occur if (1) Party A's initial WTA is at least as high as Par-
ty B's WTP; and (2) at a later stage, Party A's WTP is at least as high
as Party B's WTA. Put another way, reversals will occur only if the ag-
gregate WTP for the parties exceeds the aggregate WTA for the shift
(which will occur only if either one or both parties has a WTP greater
than its WTA). Such a circumstance would be unlikely in many of the
shapeshifting contexts described in Part I. Instead, it is more likely
that any observed shapeshifting would be due to the circumstances set
forth in Tables 2 and 3-Pareto superior moves and responses to in-
creases in value of over time, not Scitovsky reversals. A WTP less than
WTA typically is associated with inferior goods, that is, those goods for
which demand declines when wealth increases. The kinds of payoffs
likely to be present in the corporate shapeshifting context are unlikely
to involve these kinds of elasticity effects. In contrast, a normal good is a
good for which demand increases when income increases; that is, it has
a positive income elasticity of demand. In any event, even if Scitovsky
reversals are unlikely, they are a useful median boundary for assessing
why parties might agree to shapeshifting.
For instance, if one assumes that the parties do not have equal bar-
gaining power or are not fully informed, shapeshifting might more fre-
quently reflect value destroying transactions, that is, shapeshifting on
the other side of Scitovsky's limiting case. In other words, reversals
might not only fail to increase value; they might reduce value. Alterna-
tively, shapeshifting could reflect a redistribution of value among the
parties over time, and a net reduction in value due to transaction costs.
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For example, managers or controlling shareholders might extract val-
ue from going public, then extract value again from going private, and
so forth. Several reasons why such value destruction or redistribution
might occur are discussed below in Part III.
Although one might assume, as Professor Jensen and others do,
that certain shapeshifting transactions -namely, going-private transac-
tions-are normatively desirable because they reduce agency and go-
vernance costs and generate other benefits, the existence of public-
private-public cycling challenges such a conclusion." The above theoret-
ical model suggests circumstances under which cycling might occur with-
out any increase in value.
The above theoretical discussion shows that a stylized version of
Scitovsky's paradox can be seen as a median limiting case of corporate
shapeshifting transactions Shapeshifting might be neutral as to value (as
in a Scitovsky reversal), or it might add or subtract value. A straightfor-
ward cost-benefit analysis could illuminate which of the categories a
particular shapeshift would occupy.
In some cases, shapeshifting might occur without changes in un-
derlying variables and preferences over time. But the more likely cases
will occur in response to changes in those variables. The remaining chal-
lenge is to assess the relevant factors to determine whether the shape-
shifts that result are normatively desirable.
III. A SHAPESHIFTING CRITIQUE
Finally, for each of the several recent examples of shapeshifting, I
assess reasons why one might expect parties to gain or lose from the
shift. Following Coase, the main reason why it would be profitable to
establish a new shape would seem to be that there is a cost of using
the old one.
A. A Coasian Approach to Assessing Shapeshifting
In describing the relative advantages and disadvantages of the
price mechanism, Coase essentially engaged in a cost-benefit analysis.
He described different kinds of costs that might apply across a wide
range of transactions and would generate a comparative advantage for
doing business through a firm governed by an entrepreneur rather
than through a market mechanism governed by price.
41 See generally Jensen, 67 Harv Bus Rev 61 (cited in note 10). See also, for example, Scott
J. Davis, Would Changes in the Rules for Director Selectin and Liability Help Public Companies
Gain Some of Private Equity's Advantages?, 76 U Chi L Rev 83,85,92 (2009).
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Whereas Frank Knight explained the key aspects of firms based
on uncertainty,'2 Coase found that uncertainty did not explain why firms
would supersede the price function. Coase mentioned government in-
volvement in transactions as a factor, although he also doubted whether
government involvement, that is, through sales taxes favoring firms,
would constitute the raison d'9tre for the existence of firms.3 Instead,
Coase pointed to three factors that would tend to favor firms and there-
fore would tend to result in a move away from the price mechanism (and
also in larger firms): (1) low and declining costs of organizing, (2) low
and declining "mistakes" by the entrepreneur, and (3) lowering price of
factors of production."
One can recharacterize Coase's factors in the shapeshifting con-
text. Factors (1) and (3) are analogous to "direct" costs of shapeshifting.
Direct costs include both the transaction costs associated with organiz-
ing and the cost of inputs, as well as government-related costs such as
taxes and compliance. Coase's factor (2) can be analogized to "indirect"
costs of shapeshifting. Indirect costs include the efficiency gains or syn-
ergies associated with the new shape, including a reduction (or in-
crease) in agency costs. Depending on the perspective, these changes
in indirect costs might more naturally be labeled benefits than costs.
The normative arguments about shapeshifting generally should
focus on an assessment of direct and indirect costs. For example, Jen-
sen's argument in favor of going-private transactions is, in a nutshell,
an argument that a shapeshift from public to private is cost reducing,
primarily because of the reduction in indirect costs, but also because
any direct costs associated with a going-private transaction are, at a
minimum, less than the indirect gains. Likewise, some commentators
have argued that a rationale for going-private transactions is the increase
in direct costs associated with maintaining public status.'
The same kind of argument might be summarized for CDOs. Al-
though some of the direct costs of a CDO, particularly fees, are high,
the transaction reduces other direct costs, including the capital charges
associated with a financial institution holding the underlying assets.
42 See generally Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton Mifflin 1921) (de-
scribing the differences between risk and uncertainty with respect to investment decisions by firms).
43 See Coase, The Nature of the Firm at 393 (cited in note 1) (concluding that while gov-
ernment interventions make firms more normatively desirable, the current regulations are un-
likely to be the generative source of firms in the economy).
44 Id at 396-97 (identifying factors that would tend to make firms larger).
45 Robert Bartlett found that the effect of costs arising from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are
overstated because many firms are still regulated by the Act even after they go private due to
debt issuance. See Robert P Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the
Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms' Going-private Decisions, 76 U Chi L Rev 7, 25-43 (2009)
(examining data from the four years following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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More importantly, the CDO might result in a reduction of indirect costs
because it creates a new highly rated financial asset, more efficiently
incentivizes the relevant participants, and optimally spreads risks.
Some might object that it is of little value to compare different
kinds of shapeshifts. Instead, they could argue, the only illuminating
comparison would be between the same kinds of shapeshifts for a par-
ticular transaction type. In other words, one might learn from compar-
ing different going-private transactions, but not from comparing going-
private transactions to CDOs. Several participants in this Symposium
expressed this view when I presented this Article.
I disagree. I maintain that there is value in parsing arguments
about direct and indirect costs for different categories of shapeshifts,
and then comparing those categories. Indeed, the research on private
equity supports my claim, particularly given the dearth of reliable em-
pirical findings with respect to these categories.6 For example, it would
be very difficult to calculate the actual direct and indirect costs asso-
ciated with the individual private-equity IPOs discussed in Part I. Nor
would anyone be able to specify the same variables for VIEs, SIVs,
CDOs, or the other variety of shapeshifting transactions. Several par-
ticipants in this Symposium agreed that one of the striking takeaway
points from research in the area was how little anyone actually knows
about the returns and risks associated with private equity. Given the
practical impossibility of intracategory comparison, one should be re-
luctant to dismiss the potential benefits associated with intercategory
comparison, which can be useful even at a general level.
Ultimately, the normative and policy conclusions that have been,
are, and will be formed regarding shapeshifting transactions derive from
argument as much as evidence. It follows, therefore, that those argu-
ments can be bolstered by comparing one shapeshift to another. Giv-
en the difficulties of intracategory comparison through empirical re-
search, one should be reluctant to dismiss the potential benefits asso-
ciated with intercategory comparison, which can be useful even at a
general level. Moreover, even with respect to intracategory compari-
son, my cyclicality point suggests that one reasonable explanation for
transactions within a category is that transactions might benefit an indi-
vidual with power over the firm, but not be increasing value overall.
I recognize that I will not be able to persuade someone who simply
observes a large volume of shapeshifting transactions persisting, par-
ticularly among large institutions, and concludes that these transac-
46 See generally, for example, John J. Moon, Public v& Private Equity, 18 J Applied Corp
Fin 76 (2006); Gilson and Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity Ownership, 108 Colum L Rev 231
(cited in note 12).
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tions must be value increasing. Indeed, I am skeptical of market fail-
ure explanations for many categories of shapeshifting. Notwithstanding
shapeshifting's costs, it persists, and transactions are becoming larger
and more frequent.
Yet there are two reasons to be skeptical of some categories of
shapeshifting. First, shapeshifting is increasingly cyclical. At a minimum,
Scitovsky showed there are reasons to be skeptical of cycling transac-
tions. These include both the cycle of IPO, go private, IPO, go private
again; and also the cycle of issue mortgages, repackage them into se-
curities, combine the securities into a CDO, combine credit default
swaps based on the securities into a synthetic CDO, combine the CDOs
(synthetic or not) into a CDO-squared, combine all of these into an
SIV. Second, shapeshifting frequently occurs in response to regulatory
interference with market transactions. Even a strong pro-market view
would need to recognize that shapeshifting designed to arbitrage regu-
lation might not be socially useful.
My final overview point is that, given the large direct transaction
costs associated with shapeshifting, the normative assessment of particu-
lar categories is likely to turn on the extent to which the shapeshift
creates indirect incentives. A macroeconomic justification for shapeshift-
ing might dominate other explanations. The roots of such a justification
reach back to mid-nineteenth-century philosophy, although they were
popularized by the economist Joseph Schumpeter a century later as
"creative destruction." 7 The basic theme of creative destruction has been
used more recently by commentators advocating radical change at firms."
I cannot possibly include every reason why parties might shift
shapes in each category. Instead, my objective is to create a new form of
conversation about the normative analysis of transactions in each cate-
gory, to illustrate how one might use a more general model to analyze
shapeshifting in its various forms, and to distinguish among the vari-
ous factors that might motivate shapeshifting. Now, I will briefly de-
scribe some of these issues for each of the different categories of sha-
peshifting I discussed in Part I.
47 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy at 81-86 (cited in note 5) (conceptu-
alizing capitalism as an economic system that is driven by competition and innovation to create
and destroy economic structures rather than perpetuate them).
48 Richard L. Nolan and David C. Croson, Creative Destruction: A Six-stage Process for
Transforming the Organization 17-20 (Harvard Business 1995) (adapting the concept of creative





Given the model above, the debate about the normative benefits
of going-private transactions can be characterized as a debate about
whether going-private transactions are closer to a Scitovsky paradox
or perhaps a redistribution among the parties, or whether instead they
resemble a value-increasing response to market failure or regulation.
How should recent going-private shapeshifting be characterized?
As Robert Bartlett has shown, the reduction in direct costs arising from
regulation are not as significant as many critics of Sarbanes-Oxley in-
itially argued. 9 Other reductions in direct costs, including tax benefits,
are a regulatory subsidy to private firms, but it is unclear whether socie-
ty enjoys a net subsidy from this perspective.'o On the other hand, the
transaction costs associated with going private are significant. 1 The
increased compensation to senior executives has ambiguous direct
effects: essentially, it is a redistribution from shareholders to the ex-
ecutives. On a net basis, the direct costs of going private are a signifi-
cant percentage of the market capitalization of the firm.
Consequently, if going-private transactions add value, it must be
because they generate indirect benefits. Some scholars have argued
that the central benefit is a reduction in indirect costs from risk-
shifting. The argument is that financial innovation and better monitor-
ing create a permanent benefit to private shapes over public ones. For
example, Professors Gilson and Whitehead claim that "[r]isk transfer
instruments may become a lower cost substitute for public equity.'
52
They optimistically assert that in this new world, "agency costs of eq-
uity become increasingly optional."53
49 See Bartlett, 76 U Chi L Rev at 7 (cited in note 45) (suggesting that Sarbanes-Oxley "dis-
proportionately burdened small firms" and was not the impetus for many of the largest buyouts).
50 See Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding
Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 Fordham L Rev 1975,1986-92 (2008) (identifying the deduc-
tibility from taxes of interest payments as a de facto government subsidy for private equity since
public firms, for unclear reasons, are unwilling to take on as much debt as private-equity firms).
51 Transaction fees are significantly higher for going-private transactions than for many
other transaction types. To give one example, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co (KKR) took Sealy
Mattress Corporation (Sealy) private in 2004 and then arranged for its IPO in 2006. KKR re-
ceived tens of millions of dollars in fees throughout this period, as well as a significant equity stake
in Sealy. See Sealy Mattress Corp, Form 10-K for the Year Ending November 27,2005 34, 76,95,
online at http://idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1295735/000104746906002518/a2167865zlO-k.htm
(visited Jan 11, 2009) (disclosing over $35 million paid in consulting and merger fees to KKR and
Bain Capital). Some reports put the total fees for the Sealy transactions at approximately $116 million.
See They Can Hide It in the Mattress, Going Private Blog (Mar 27,2006), online at httpJ/equityprivate.
typepad.com/ep/lipo_suction/indexltml (visited Jan 11, 2009).
52 Gilson and Whitehead, 108 Colum L Rev at 247 (cited in note 12).
53 Id at 239 (arguing that the costs of increasingly sophisticated risk management are rela-
tively lower than the agency costs of using public equity to manage risk).
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Yet this view overstates for several reasons the effects of risk man-
agement and the extent to which risk changes would lead companies to
shift to a private shape. First, firms can only transfer risks if they can
specify what those risks are. In most cases, those risks cannot be speci-
fied but instead reflect "Knightian uncertainty."
Second, as Gilson and Whitehead recognize, there is an increased
risk of moral hazard associated with how private corporations insure
key risks. Some party must bear residual risks, regardless of the level of
available financial innovation. To the extent those risks are hedged or
insured, private parties will no longer have the same incentives to man-
age them. Indeed, risk management by private firms has the same dele-
terious consequences that Jensen decried from private-equity IPOs.
Third, it is important not to conflate risk shifting with capital rais-
ing. Even as new risk management techniques proliferate, firms still
need capital. Financial innovation might reduce the cost of that capi-
tal, but it does not render capital unnecessary.
Fourth, arguments about changes brought about by new risk man-
agement techniques apply equally to both the public and private shapes
of business. The benefits from risk management flow to both private
and public forms. Indeed, the Agricore United example that Gilson
and Whitehead use is a public corporation.5 But even if it were a pri-
vate corporation, the introduction of sophisticated risk management
necessarily would entail a new and more complicated structure to moni-
tor risks and to implement position limits and deductibles, as well as
hedge accounting.
If one firm hedges, and therefore needs less equity, its counterparty
would take on additional risk, and presumably would need more equity.
Would that firm be private or public? Financial innovation might mean
certain kinds of firms are more likely to be private. But it seems more
likely that others who really are focused on innovative risk manage-
ment would be more likely to be public. In any event, the overwhelming
evidence is that large financial institutions are public, not private.
As a separate question, it is worth asking whether housing risk-
management within public firms is a normatively desirable result. There
is evidence that it is not.-4 Such public firms are poorly managed, trade
at low multiples, and suffer extreme losses. But this analysis merely sug-
54 See Jensen, The Economic Case for Private Equity at slides 24-27 (cited in note 8) (arguing
that private-equity firms have better incentives to make deals work when the firms are private and
do not rely on public shareholders for capital).
55 Gilson and Whitehead, 108 Colum L Rev at 238-39 (cited in note 12) (describing how Agri-
core used outside insurance to change its capital structure and increase its debt financing levels).
56 See Fred R. Kaen, Risk Management, Corporate Governance and the Public Corporation,
in Michael Frankel, et al, eds, Risk Management 423 (Springer 2d ed 2005).
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gests that financial innovation has little to do with public versus private
choice. Indeed, one might argue financial innovation tends to the oppo-
site effect, and diminishes the need for private equity.
A more plausible argument in favor of going-private transactions
is creative destruction. If a public firm is no longer responding nimbly
to market incentives, it faces few radical options. Some firms can re-
structure, implement substantial layoffs, or hire consultants to propose
radical strategic change. But other firms find it impossible to achieve
significant change, particularly if managers are entrenched. Going-
private transactions might be justified as a mechanism to implement
change. Moreover, the threat of a going-private transaction might create
positive second-order incentives, as public company shareholders press
for change without giving up gains from private control.
In any event, the normative justification for going-private trans-
actions depends on the presence of significant indirect benefits asso-
ciated with a reduction in agency and governance costs. Scholars who
want to support a movement towards privatization of equity would be
better off demonstrating empirically that these benefits accrue than
grasping for arguments about risk-shifting.
C. Private-equity IPOs
In contrast, private-equity IPOs are more difficult to defend. Like
going-private transactions, the fees associated with private-equity IPOs
are substantial.' Underwriter fees for IPOs generally are in the range of
7 percent.m Audit and legal fees also are substantial. Moreover, to the
extent IPOs generate other direct costs associated with publicly held
firms, including Sarbanes-Oxley compliance and reduced debt, those
costs apply as well.
Why then would private-equity firms sell shares to the public?
One motivation is clearly to enable a liquidation event for the owners.
But why might public shareholders highly value the shares of private-
equity firms? Put more simply, what has changed at the portfolio firms
held by the private-equity firms that would generate higher multiples
from public shareholders? For skeptics of market efficiency, there is
an information asymmetry rationale for the IPOs, many of which were
57 For example, the fees associated with the Blackstone IPO were estimated at $170 million.
See Elizabeth Hester and Jason Kelly, Blackstone Founders to Get $2.33 Billion in fP0, Bloom-
berg.com (June 11,2007), online at http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=20601087&refer=
home&sid=awhwwCBOR.21 (visited Jan 11,2009).
58 See, for example, Hsuan-Chi Chen and Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J
Fin 1105, 1105 (2000). However, recent events may be decreasing this percentage. See Paul Wah-
ba, IPO View-Low U.S IPO Volume Hits Banks' Bottom Line (Reuters Jan 16,2009), online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNewslidUSN1340259220090116 (visited Feb 10, 2009).
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done at relative market peaks. Because the private-equity firms retain
a partnership structure, they have certain advantages relative to public
companies regarding tax and stock exchange governance requirements.
But these direct costs are not reduced; they merely do not increase.
In addition to high direct costs, private-equity IPOs are likely to
have high indirect costs as well. For example, in the Blackstone IPO,
Blackstone retained both the partnership form and control. The IPO
was for units with economic rights but limited voting rights in Black-
stone. 9 Investors' cash flow rights were limited.'°
These attributes of private-equity IPOs have led Professor Jensen
to decry these private-to-public shifts and to argue that giving private-
equity managers permanent public capital is dangerous. As Jensen
describes it, "When Fortress and Blackstone and others take the core
management company public they have put at risk another of the ma-
jor competitive advantage[s] the [private-equity] firm has. In Black-
stone's case the new public holders of the limited partnership have vir-
tually no say in the governance of the enterprise. ' Jensen argues that,
as control rights shift post-IPO, private-equity managers will have an
incentive to focus more on governance than business, and accordingly
their performance and returns will suffer.
It certainly is the case that these IPOs have performed poorly, al-
though it is less clear whether that decline is due primarily to the fac-
tors Jensen mentions. Unlike many IPOs, these shifts in shape are not
driven by a need for capital. The private-equity firms' businesses re-
quired little capital, particularly compared to other financial firms. In-
59 The Blackstone Group LP is a limited partnership and the general partner of investment
funds:
Our general partner, Blackstone Group Management L.L.C., will manage all of our opera-
tions and activities. Unlike the holders of common stock in a corporation, you will have on-
ly limited voting rights on matters affecting our business and will have no right to elect our
general partner or its directors, which will be elected by our founders.
The Blackstone Group LP, Form S-1 15 (Mar 22, 2007), online at http://idea.sec.gov/Archives
edgar/data1393818/000104746907002068/a2176832zs-l.htm (visited Jan 11, 2009) (explaining the
voting rights of the shares on offer). See also id at 44 ("Accordingly, immediately following this
offering our senior managing directors will generally have sufficient voting power to determine
the outcome of those few matters that may be submitted for a vote of the limited partners of The
Blackstone Group L.P., including any attempt to remove our general partner.").
60 Id at 47-48:
After consummation of this offering, we intend to pay cash distributions on a quarterly ba-
sis. The Blackstone Group L.E will be a holding partnership and will have no material as-
sets other than the ownership of the partnership units in Blackstone Holdings held through
wholly-owned subsidiaries. The Blackstone Group L.P. has no independent means of gene-
rating revenue.. .. The declaration and payment of any future distributions will be at the
sole discretion of our general partner.
61 Jensen, The Economic Case for Private Equity at slide 27 (cited in note 8).
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stead, the IPOs seem to have been driven by the demand side, not the
supply side, from investors who wanted to participate in the returns to
private equity, in the same way they have wanted to participate in the
returns to investment banking partnerships.
Overall, the direct costs of these IPOs are high, and the indirect
benefits seem slight or nonexistent. Moreover, the fact that the underly-
ing businesses are cycling through public-to-private forms so quickly,
often in just a few years, suggests that the normative justification for
these transactions is weak.
D. Public Company Regulatory Arbitrage
Regulation can drive shapeshifting, particularly in the context of
the overlapping regulatory structures that apply to public operating com-
panies and investment firms. For example, regulations in the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 -specifically Form 13F filing rules-would
have required the hedge fund ESL to specify all of its investments in
equity securities on a quarterly basis;6' but Sears Holding Corporation,
as a publicly registered company, was not required to make any such
quarterly filing.A Simply put, Sears was not required to disclose the in-
vestments underlying its total return swaps with any level of specificity.
The direct costs from public company regulatory arbitrage are not
as high as those for going-private transactions or IPOs. Total return
swap transaction fees in aggregate are likely just a fraction of a percent.
The bigger issue is indirect costs. Here, the tradeoff is between effi-
ciency and transparency. On one hand, there might be gains associated
with permitting a hedge fund manager to take positions without disclos-
ing them, in order to avoid front-running and to minimize costs. On
the other hand, investors in public companies are less able to make an
informed decision about the value of Sears shares without knowing
the specific securities that underlie the swaps.
As with private-equity IPOs, Sears's total return swap strategy
recently has been less successful. Sears lost $21 million on the swaps in
2007 and, as of May 3,2008, had no total return swaps outstanding.0 But
the question is not so much whether this particular strategy will work.
62 Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub L No 76-768, 54 Stat 789, codified at 15 USC
§ 80a-1 et seq.
63 See SEC, Division of Investnent Management Frequently Asked Questions about Form 13F,
question 2 (May 2005), online at http'J/ser-gov/divisionsfmvestmentt13ffaq.htm (visited Jan 11, 2009)
(stating that all institutional investors must disclose their securities holdings).
64 See generally id.
65 Sears Holdings Corporation, Form 10-Q Filing for the Quarter Ending May 3, 2008 6, on-
line at http'J/idea.sec.gov/Archivestedgar/data/1310067/000119312508125083/dlOq.htm (visited Feb
10, 2009) (disclosing no total return swaps outstanding and previous total return swap losses).
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Nor is it a complete answer to say that the obvious regulatory response
is to treat public companies the same and to require disclosure. It is
not clear how or whether regulators could implement such a proposal,
and in any event regulatory gaps that present opportunities for regula-
tory arbitrage among corporate forms would remain.
It is difficult to see how positive indirect incentive effects justify
permitting some companies to avoid disclosure requirements that ap-
ply to investment companies with more than $100 million under man-
agement. Yet pressure for increased disclosure by hedge funds and oth-
er investors will continue to shift the regulatory balance so that public
companies overall will be subject to fewer disclosure requirements than
hedge funds. Moreover, transparency has its limits: no firm is required
to disclose every detail. The challenge for proponents of these shape-
shifting arbitrage transactions will be to show some tangible benefit
counterposed against a decline in transparency.
E. VIEs, SIVs, and CDOs
Finally, the most dysfunctional shapeshifting transactions involve the
creation and use of special purpose entities. The regulatory framework is
complicated, so this Part will touch only a few highlights. The overarch-
ing message is that the direct and indirect costs associated with the use
of SPEs in shapeshifting is high, and so scholars and policymakers
should be skeptical of such transactions.
The QSPE framework applies when an entity transfers or sells fi-
nancial assets to an SPE meeting certain criteria defined in Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards 140 (SFAS 140).6 These criteria are
designed to ensure that the activities of the entity are predetermined and
that the transferor cannot exercise control over the entity or its assets.
When an SPE does not meet the QSPE criteria in SFAS 140, it is
assessed under Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpreta-
tion No 46 (FIN 46), which was revised as FIN 46(R) in 2003 after non-
consolidation of various SPEs.6, In a vocabulary shift, if not a substan-
tive one, the FASB defined a variable interest entity as representing a
contractual or ownership interest in any entity that changes along with
changes in the fair value of that entity's net assets. Ownership is no
longer the sole basis for consolidation, so any entity might be consi-
dered a VIE if it can be designed so that the equity investors have li-
mited exposure to the risks and rewards of ownership. The key ele-
66 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
140,4-5 (Sept 2000), online at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl4O.pdf (visited Jan 11,2009).




ments of analysis under FIN 46(R) have become calculations of expected
losses and expected residual returns associated with a variable interest.
Specifically, under FIN 46(R), a VIE is defined as an entity that
(1) lacks enough equity at risk to permit the entity to finance its activi-
ties without additional subordinated financial support from other par-
ties, (2) has equity owners that lack the right to make significant deci-
sions affecting the entity's operations, or (3) has equity owners who do
not have an obligation to absorb the entity's losses or receive the entity's
returns. A complete analysis of FIN 46(R) is beyond the scope of this
Article. I simply want to note that FIN 46(R) creates a platform for a
new set of shape changes. Moreover, FIN 46(R) applies to private com-
panies as well as public companies. Initially, the FASB envisioned that
FIN 46(R) would broaden entities subject to consolidation, as it moved
away from any requirement that majority ownership was required for
consolidation. Although FIN 46(R) initially appeared to be simple-it
was only forty-one paragraphs-it immediately generated a flurry of
commentary in response to the sixty pages of FASB appendices that
purported to provide guidance and explanation.
Special purpose entity transactions have cycled over time. Con-
sider, for example, (1) the proliferation of SPEs through 2002; (2) the
shift to primarily on-balance sheet financing through 2005; (3) the shift
back to QSPEs, VIEs, and particularly securitizations through SIVs and
CDOs; and (4) the recent shift back to primarily on-balance sheet fi-
nancing. Some explanations for these shifts are that parties are respond-
ing to market and regulatory changes and that there is a reduction in
the direct costs associated with consolidation.
Another potential explanation is that these shifts represent Sci-
tovsky reversals (at best). This story would go something like this: man-
agers of a company see that they can be made better off if the company
uses these vehicles, so their company does so. The managers are better
off and the shareholders are no worse off, at least initially (alternative-
ly, shareholders are worse off, and the normative justification for the
shapeshifting is even less). A few years later, because of changes in
market conditions, shareholders of the company see that they can be
made better off if the company stops using these vehicles, so the com-
pany does so. And so forth.
In the stylized example in Part II, the paradox arose because the
preferences of the two parties generated simultaneous net gains from
both a hypothetical move and its reversal. Conditions that generate
similar results might exist for structured finance transactions. Of course,
it would be difficult to specify the preferences of parties in the same
68 Id at 5-7.
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way as the stylized example. Nevertheless, agency costs might substi-
tute for preference assumptions as a potential explanation of cyclical
shapeshifting transactions.
Thus, my point is more modest than Scitovsky's strong theoretical
claim that shifts cannot be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Given that shapeshift-
ing actually occurs over time, not simultaneously, I simply want scholars
to recognize that, given the dearth of empirical evidence about shape-
shifting, it is possible that some shapeshifts, particularly cyclical shape-
shifts, might not result in net value creation. Each shapeshift might, on its
own, be justified as Kaldor-Hicks efficient. After all, one might argue,
why else would parties engage in these transactions? Yet, when consi-
dered collectively over time, this kind of shapeshifting presents a para-
dox. How can the back-and-forth shifts among managers and sharehold-
ers each satisfy a reasonable efficiency criterion?
Of course, this example is highly simplified, and the shifts occur
over time under differing market conditions. Yet the core intuition of the
criticism of these transactions resembles the Scitovsky paradox. Mar-
ket participants are shifting back and forth among regimes, cycling
through transaction choices over time. Without more, it would be diffi-
cult to justify such cycling under a Kaldor-Hicks efficient rationale.
SIVs and CDOs present an interesting twist related to correlation
calculations and the importance of credit ratings. Financial institutions
long have securitized home mortgages by using a corporate structure that
purchases pools of mortgages and finances the purchases by issuing rated
tranches of securities backed by the mortgages. Until recently, the rating
methodologies of the major credit rating agencies, Moody's and S&P in
particular, were not applied to further securitizations of such assets.
However, beginning in the early 2000s, financial institutions saw
that they could create new firm shapes that would arbitrage the credit
ratings assigned to tranches of securities backed by the same mortgages.
Specifically, the valuation methodologies employed by the agencies per-
mitted financial institutions to purchase mortgages and, largely because
of unreasonable correlation and expected default/recovery assumptions,
obtain higher ratings for retranched SIV and CDO vehicles than for
the underlying mortgage securitizations. Indeed, the arbitrage gener-
ated such wide spreads that there was not enough cash mortgage col-
lateral,6 so a new firm shape, the synthetic CDO based on credit default
69 Cash mortgage collateral or any "reference portfolio made up of cash assets such as
corporate bonds or loans," has a real-world value in addition to its value in the CDO. See Michael S
Gibson, Understanding the Risk of Synthetic CDOs *3 (FEDS Working Paper No 2004-36, July
2004), online at http://paperssm.com/sol3/paperscfn?abstract_id=596442 (visited Jan 11, 2009)
(describing the difference between cash CDOs and synthetic CDOs and explaining the rise of
synthetic CDOs as a response to arbitrage demand).
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swaps, was created to synthetically replicate the payoffs on underlying
mortgage collateral that was not available. In many instances, the un-
derlying mortgage collateral became the basis for dozens of instru-
ments whose payoffs depended on that collateral's value.
In each of these transactions, new corporate entities were created,
with novel capital structures, assets, and corporate governance. The enti-
ties included off-shore corporations, dual co-issuer structures, and LLCs.
These transactions generated substantial direct costs, perhaps
1 percent overall on hundreds of billions of dollars of transactions.
Moreover, it is difficult to discern any indirect benefits. Although pro-
ponents argue that the new forms complete markets and enable inves-
tors to take on positions that previously were unavailable, any such effi-
ciencies are overwhelmed by the increase in information asymmetry
that results from such new forms.71 Indeed, the forms were so compli-
cated, and created such perverse incentives, that a significant share of
the costs associated with the use of the entities was borne unexpected-
ly by the banks that created them."
VIEs, SIVs, and CDOs are largely a response to regulation, a fact
that complicates the normative analysis of shapeshifting. Without rules
that permitted nonconsolidation or gave credit rating agencies effective
"regulatory licenses" to determine when investors could purchase and
hold particular assets, these shapeshifts might not have been worth the
cost. Yet because of legal rules, the shapeshifts generate private benefits
to at least some of the participants (most commonly to agents of firms,
but not principals). The open question is whether such transactions, or
even more problematic shapeshifts, would occur absent regulation.
CONCLUSION
Shapeshifting is a fundamental narrative in fact and fiction. Like
the moral conclusions of tales of lycanthropy and therianthropy, the
normative implications of corporate shapeshifting are mixed. My mod-
est goal in this Article is simply to introduce the notion of shapeshift-
ing as a general phenomenon.
On one hand, shapeshifting can reflect the efficiency of markets
as corporate structures move to their most highly valued shape. The
70 See Mark Whitehouse, Slices of Risk- How a Formula Ignited Market that Burned Investors,
Wall St J Al (Sept 12, 2005) (describing synthetic CDOs as a method of replicating securities
"without going to the trouble" of purchasing those securities).
71 See Carrick Mollenkamp and Serena Ng, Wall Street Wizardry Amplified Credit Crisis,
Wall St J Al (Dec 27,2007), (describing how each investment bank passed off the riskiest securi-
ties to the next purchaser due to the asymmetry of information in the transactions).
72 See Joe Nocera, Risk Management, NY Times MM 24 (Jan 4,2009) (describing the fail-
ure of banks to foresee the risks of these securities, which led to massive losses at most banks).
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very act of shapeshifting generates potential benefits. On the other
hand, shapeshifting can reflect the extraction of private value or the
transaction costs associated with inefficient legal rules.
Public companies use going-private transactions to avoid costs
and sharpen incentives. Private-equity firms use IPOs to become pub-
lic companies. Public companies use total return swaps to become in-
vestment companies without the typically applicable disclosure rules.
Banks use variable interest entities and credit derivatives to become le-
veraged carry traders. Institutional investors use structured finance spe-
cial purpose entities to become mortgage conduits. Mortgage conduits
use total return swaps to become arbitrage vehicles. Insurance compa-
nies use credit derivatives to become correlation traders. Off-shore
funds use credit default swaps to become insurance companies. Early-
stage companies and venture capitalists use new corporate forms to
raise capital. And so on.
This Article's primary contribution is to situate these individual
phenomena in a broader theoretical context. Going-private transactions
are an example of shapeshifting; they are the most easily defended, but
there are many others. Given increasing financial innovation, scholars
undoubtedly will see new shape examples in the future. When they do,
it will be worthwhile to remember that those transactions have a place
within a bigger picture.
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